We compute the rate of textual signals of risk of war recognizable in series of consecutive political speeches about a disputed issue serious enough to entail an international conflict. The speeches concern Iran's nuclear program. We trace textual signals forewarning of risks of war that reactions to this affair lead to.
Wars are like the uncontrollably complex soliton waves. Solitons result from normal after-waves that superpose one onto another to multiplicative effect (Herman, 1992) . Our matter concerns one of these waves, the latent threats buried in speeches by political elites about a disputed issue serious enough to entail a risk of war. Our purpose is to recognise textual signals prefiguring these threats in transnational databases of texts. We centred on the speeches of four political figures in Iran, Israel, and the USA about Iran's nuclear affair. For Iran, the figures are the Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Iran's is a hybrid secular-clerical government (Hashemi and Postel, 2011) , a reason for analysing not one governmental source of data, but two, Ayatollah Khamenei on the clerical side and President Ahmadinejad on the secular one. For now, clerical dominance remains the rule (Dalton, 2010 It is not our job to like or dislike the Iranian issue, which is our object, not our cause. In truth, it is the words about the affair that are our object, not the affair itself. Our job is (i) to concentrate on political speeches related to the issue, (ii) use empirical methods to sift and order the information received and processed, and (iii) winnow from these speeches recognizable signals about the risk of war. At day's end, our job is to reduce uncertainty by foreshadowing what might happen before it happens, that is, by building up an index of risk of war that changes before war breaks out. The future may not be predictable. Some may not even wish it to be predictable. 'The idea of the future being different from the present is so repugnant to our conventional modes of thought and behaviour that we, most of us, offer a great resistance to acting on it in practice' (Keynes, 1937, p. 13) . Using reason for forecasting human behaviours by looking for signals of possible events is worthier than palm reading to understand all that is unreasonable in man. Every day, we use the words 'expectation', 'yearning', 'curiosity', 'death', which signal a deep wish to peer into the future. A way to meet this wish without getting the future wrong is to focus on 'degrees of uncertainty about the future' (Tetlock, 2005, p. 45 ) and indeed about the risk of war.
The good news is that 'We can learn a great deal about people's underlying (. . .) motives by counting and categorising the words they use to communicate' (Newman et al., 2003, p. 666) . This is not to say that words of war or peace cause war or peace as a billiard ball would hit another, for there is no causal logic here. (Our concern is with a different logic, deeply rooted in a motive imagery model to be expounded later, one that points the way to a risk of war or a chance of peace). Nor is it to say that we can predict war or peace, or prove the risk of war, for the only proven risk of war is war itself. Even troop build-ups, a usually reasonable indicator, do not necessarily lead to war. It is to say that we can point to risks of war or peace from mere imperfect signals worth vigilance, no matter how much hiding, misrepresenting, or omitting the speeches contain. To make a signal of risk of war appear through the batches of speeches requires bringing them down to a single scale in a time sequence and then isolating the signal. Yet, whether issued from experts or from words, forecasts do fail sometimes (Tetlock, 1999 (Tetlock, , 2005 . On this side, the problem is not only one of foreseeing risks. It is also one of deciding which is more costly (in expenses or in threat to lives): detecting a false signal of a war in the making (causing expenses only) or missing a true signal of a war in the making (causing expenses and threat to lives). Even so, thinking there is war when there is not could lead to problems like anger or attacks, which may in turn cause a war. In this vein, social scientists have exploited various linguistic routes by raiding on words to look for signals of coming wars. Among the routes to analyse threatening or non-threatening political texts are historical accounts of collective memories (Garagozov, 2008 (Garagozov, , 2012 Wertsch, 2002) and media analysis (Heinrich and Tanaev, 2009 ). Other tools include dictionary-based linguistic indicators Pennebaker et al., 2003) , motives analysis (Smith, 2008) , associative measurements (Osgood, 1959) , and stylistic indicators (Hart, 1984 ). Hart's DICTION (Hart and Lind, 2011) , for example, is a dictionary to analyse political rhetoric, ideology, and style. Computer-readable dictionaries prevail for assessing mood in extensive political documents or in the media. Among mood dictionaries, there are, for example, Young and Soroka's (2012) LSD (Lexicoder Sentiment Dictionary), Whissell's (2009) DAL (Dictionary of Affective Language), or Pennebaker and Chung's (2008) LIWC (Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count) . Finally, in a world where visibility is dim, using automated coding of texts to forecast events (Schrodt and Gerner, 2000) holds a contributive place apart. Schrodt's KEDS (Kansas Event Data System) project relies on news reports collated by news agencies: political event data analysis includes cluster analysis procedures and Markov chain models linking the distribution of present and future states.
There is cause to wonder if we could ever read the entirety of the speeches we analyse (1, 187, 404 words in the present corpus, Table 1 , to be (Bronk, 2011) .
Relying on the words available may in these cases offer access to strategic intelligence that is otherwise scanty. Another use for words is when the actors of a war in the making deflect attention on war preparations using deceptive smokescreens (Chung and Pennebaker, 2011, p. 19 McClelland (1975, pp. 314-359) develops the notion of 'imperial motivation pattern', which is the gap between a high need for power and a low need for affiliation. He shows how, in history, reformist zeal for social justice, that is, the use of one's own power to save others, irrespective of whether they like it, is often the link-not to be confused with the cause-between the 'imperial motivation pattern' and later wars. The wider the gap, the greater the risk of war. Consider, for example, President Harry Truman's (1947) 'I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures'. This aura of collective enthusiasm runs like a recurring theme before every war, an axiom often running masked under the guise of helpfulness: the use of one's own power to save others-call it the rage to convince-is often the sign of wars to come. In Cioran's (1998, p. 30) words, 'One hardly saves a world without ruling it'. All in all, the power-affiliation motive imagery matters because it lays out a way of linking different types of conflicts. This was a good enough reason to turn McClelland's view of the motivational root of wars into a tool to assess the risk of war in continuous texts, and use a procedure that guarantees the same treatment for each document. We do not ask judges to score speeches manually for the presence or absence of motive imagery. Rather, we draw on words of affiliation and words of power to build up a motive imagery dictionary on McClelland's model. The dictionary is then loaded in a suite of computerised content analysis programs set to carry out the menial work.
So, how do we fare with the motivational roots of war in assessing the risk of war? To test the truth of the dictionary that we built on McClelland's model, we analysed stories and real-life documents about emerging conflicts. So far, we collated 36 corpora totaling 4,169,687 words. 1 We expected each of these accounts to display similar profiles characterised by increases of the index of risk of war, that is, an increasing gap between the need for power (rising) and the need for affiliation (falling) before the outbreak of the conflict. Among fictional materials (Hogenraad, 2003) , William Golding's (1954) 'Lord of the Flies' is emblematic of a peaceful start giving way to a conflict. The novel relates the survival story of a group of boys who, after a plane crash, set up a fragile community on a deserted island. After initially enjoying their freedom, the group soon divides into fearsome gangs, which turn the paradise island into a nightmare of fears and death. Chapter after chapter, the motive imagery indicator reliably tracks the emerging conflict within the group. In Tolstoy's (1997) 'War and Peace', the epic story of a family life during the Napoleonic wars from 1805 to 1812, the gap between the need for power and the need for affiliation increases linearly as expected. We extended tests of the motive imagery dictionary to real-life accounts of conflicts. In particular, we matched up diplomatic documents preceding the outbreak of past wars (Hogenraad, 2005 (Hogenraad, , 2008 to the wordbased index of risk of war. We assessed the likelihood of these past wars before they broke out. Confirmation of a likely war occurred, for example, in our analysis of the Anglo-American intervention in Iraq using the speeches of President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair from 11 September 2001 to 20 March 2003 (Hogenraad, 2005) . We also confirmed a likely war in the analysis of the speeches that preceded the military confrontation between Georgia and Russia of August 2008 (Hogenraad and Garagozov, 2010) . Over the year 2008, the risk of war was increasing in the speeches of President Medvedev of Russia. That risk was increasing too among US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and European leaders. But the risk of war was decreasing in the speeches of President Saakashvili. The grudging conciliatoriness of President Saakashvili seemingly contradicted his final twist when he finally rushed to war. Yet appeasement turned out to be a correct estimate of the risk of war when it appeared Saakashvili had perhaps been trapped into a war he did not want (Popjanevski, 2009, pp. 153-155) .
For their part, Chung and Pennebaker (2011) reviewed the usefulness of the motive imagery model to screen out threatening communications that they define as 'explicit planning of an aggressive action while at the same time concealing the planned action from the target' (p. 18). One can begin, they continue, to appreciate how word counts can betray intentions and future actions (p. 19). And intentions are what motive imagery hits on. Using trained human scorers, Smith et al. (2008; see also Winter, 2011) found increased levels of power imagery and lower levels of integrative complexity in terrorist groups than in non-terrorist groups. Frisch (2010) found that both integrative complexity (Suedfeld and Tetlock, 1977) and motive imagery measures were in accordance to predict intents of the actors of the August 2008 Russian intervention in Georgia. There are also measures of affiliation and power to explore the First Israeli-Palestinian Oslo Accords of 1993 (Tripscha et al., 2006) .
The Embarrassment of Ambiguity: In Praise of Vagueness
It may not have been lost on observers of language that the vagueness of language gnaws away at the credibility of textual analyses. By vagueness, we mean a language that evokes no specific facts or knowledge, and suggests an unwillingness to communicate clearly (Empson, 2004; Péladeau, 2005) . Vague and evasive words defeat clarity indeed. But there is another way to see vagueness that does not give it a bad name. What tells against a negative view is the sense in which ambiguity can be productive because it allows ideas to evolve. At the moment an idea is molded into a frozen form like an overspecific word, it is drained and less likely to lead to innovative solutions in negotiation, as when discussing a draft agreement for example (Doonan and Foster, 2001, p. 97) . In 'The Ambiguity Advantage', Wilkinson (2006) has described a progression running from ambiguity, risk, vagueness, confusion down to chaos. But he shows also how leaders can use ambiguity, lead others through chaos, and create opportunities for them.
The question of vagueness is way beyond the prospect of this study. Besides, broaching the rate of stylistic vagueness, that is, words with a diffuse meaning (Sebeok, 1960, pp. 370-371) , in the analysis of the content of textual data brings a confusion of levels. Yet different levels can sometimes be brought into useful confrontation. We had to make a point, but we are still in need of a corrective. On one side, we did not enter vague words in the motive imagery dictionary. Vague expressions like more or less, somewhat, aspect, something, and so on fill everyday language, which only the context of situation can clear up (Malinowski, 1935, p. 11) . On the other side, there are other ways, besides vague words, for ambiguity to sneak into language, like calculated ambivalences, insinuations, or dubious wordplays as used in racist and populist speeches (Wodak, 2003 (Wodak, , 2007 . Even the 'war on terror' label remains vague in the 9/11 context (Reese and Lewis, 2009) , whereas its parts enter in the motive imagery dictionary. As Orwell (1981, p. 167) said 'When the general atmosphere is bad, language must suffer'. In truth, the quasi-opposites of vagueness, that is, dogmatism, authoritarianism, or certainty, more often caught the attention of social scientists on the idea that one could not achieve one without failing the other. Hart (1984; Hart and Lind, 2011), Rokeach (1960) , and indeed Ertel (1972) are among those who dug at dogmatism. Hart set up a computer-aided text analysis with dictionary (DICTION). One subcategory of DICTION, CERTAINTY, taps words expressed with full authority (crowd, army, fully, always, for example). From this set, another set of words expressing ambiguity is subtracted (somewhere, perhaps, seems, for example) to draw a final score of CERTAINTY. Incidentally, one notices a partial overlap between entries such as crowd or army in the COLLECTIVES subcategory of DICTION and the NEED FOR POWER category of the motive imagery dictionary.
The imperfect solution we devised, not to correct but to evaluate the rate of vagueness in our serial data, is this. We brought to bear Hiller's (1971) Communication Vagueness Scale to follow the rate of vagueness in the series of speeches. In this way, unable to get away with ambiguity, we could at least keep an eye on it. To put it simply, in a high-strung interplay, one would expect the language of a party open to settlement to contain more and more vague and evasive words, leaving doors open. And one would expect the opposite from a party resolved to reject negotiation, that is, a language with fewer and fewer ambiguous words, leaving no chance for ideas to evolve, or to repeat them in slightly different versions. This is what we found in the analysis of the communications that preceded the conflict between Georgia and the Russian Federation (January to August, 2008) over the separatist regions of Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia (Hogenraad and Garagozov, 2010, p. 22) . President Saakashvili was open to negotiate with the separatist regions; his statements contained an increasing number of vague words over time, not unlike a strategy of survival. President Medvedev on the contrary was determined on the Georgian question and his statements were gaining in precision.
To sum up, we have a purpose (detecting signals of coming war or appeasement) equipped with proper tools (prevision-oriented dictionaries), a procedure (computer-aided content analysis), and data (political speeches transferred from official web sites) we will present soon. The tools are the motive imagery dictionary detailed to make the risk of war or the chance of appeasement emerge from the data, and the vagueness dictionary detailed to evaluate the rate of vagueness in the statements.
Method

Texts
We summarise in Table 1 the database of speeches (1,187,404 words) in the English translations available. We indexed the speeches for their day, month, and year of production. We suspended collating the series of speeches after January 2012. We collated the speeches of Ayatollah Khamenei from the web site of the Supreme Leader of Iran (Supreme Leader of Iran, Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei, All speeches). We collated the speeches of President 
Computer-aided content analysis, motive imagery dictionary, and vagueness dictionary
We enter the texts in consecutive order, with codes to slice the texts. We then run a computer-aided content analysis procedure, PROTAN (for PROTocol ANalyzer) , to trawl the data using computer-readable dictionaries organised into hierarchical categories. Computer-aided content analysis itemises and orders words into lists and numbers. The procedure involves entering, pruning declensions and verb forms, arranging texts into frequency tables and then looking for matches between words in a dictionary and words in a text. One then counts the number of word matches in the categories, and takes the percentage of the number of matches in each category. Dictionaries can be of two types, category-based and norm-based. Both types are useful assets for the humanities and the study of natural language. Category-based dictionaries rest on some theory that they embody (Wilson, 2011) . Norm-based ones refer to some semantic property like concreteness or emotions. Building dictionaries of either type is time-consuming. Vincze and Bestgen (2011) have recently developed and validated a new automatic procedure for expanding lexical norms by analysing co-occurrences in texts. With adaptations, their procedure could be extended to category-based dictionaries (Y. Bestgen, personal communication).
The category-based motive imagery dictionary (version 6.0, 2012) is a database of needs for affiliation (837 entries, English words and roots) and needs for power (1724 entries) ( Table 2 ). The dictionary is designed so any word assigned to one category cannot be present in another one except in its superordinate category. For example, in Table 2 , the entry sweetheart in subcategory AFFECTION can be assigned only to the higher up category of AFFILIATION and to no other one. The text words being set in alphabetical order, each text word is then compared with the dictionary entries also set alphabetically, until a match is found. The matches are then recorded, summed, and averaged over the unit chosen (by month in the present study).
Lastly, we quantified how much vagueness there was in our documents, using Hiller's Communication Vagueness Scale Hiller, 1971 (Péladeau, 2005) . There is no semantic homogeneity in the scale we used, with permission (J. H. Hiller, personal communication) , to assess vagueness in our documents. We computed a global rate of vagueness from the vagueness scale (the percentage of the number of vague words to the total number of words in the section of the document under analysis). Hiller's scale detected item clarity in questionnaires (Ford et al., 2000) . The scale also correlated with writing quality in students' essays . Authors used Hiller's scales to evaluate the efficacy of teaching programs (Land, 1981) and the effect of discourse markers on reading comprehension (Chaudron and Richard, 1986) . Another use of Hiller's procedure has been as a cognitive aid for improving information communication and for helping information processing in psychological treatment (Rosenthal and Downs, 1985) . Eventually, vagueness scales could be applied profitably to evaluate the quality of scientific writing (Hogenraad et al., 1992) . Because vagueness characterises style and not content, it can be extended from its origin in education to other kinds of written documents, political for example.
Results
Statistical treatments comprise (i) removing autocorrelations, (ii) regression and resampling statistics, and (iii) identifying cutoff-points in the regression profiles. (i) Speeches of any political figure carry traces of previous speeches by the same figure. To ensure independent observations, we randomise data. It is impossible to randomise textual data because the temporal order is part of the information carried by them: serial texts impinge on one another. Dependencies in the temporal order of texts create apparent changes without genuine ones. We remove the systematic dependency in the temporal series (autocorrelation) from the data (Hogenraad et al., 1997) .
(ii) Because texts are unrepeatable events, one cannot analyse the sampling error. It then becomes necessary to simulate observations we do not have using those we have. To evaluate how stable is the statistical estimator, we ran systematically 20,000 bootstrapped simulations of the regressions to capture the confidence region of the boundary values of unique textual data (Diaconis and Efron, 1983; Hogenraad and McKenzie, 1999) . The bootstrap method we used is part of SimStat for Windows (Péladeau, 1996) . (iii) Under the seemingly smooth increases or decreases of risk of war, we want to know if there are turning points (waterfalls or cliffs) hidden in the time sequences. We used the CART (Classification and Regression Trees) non-parametric procedure (Breiman et al., 1993; Efron and Tibshirani, 1991) of statistical decision-making that hierarchically splits data into progressively smaller turning points. Unlike single change-point tests (Siegel and Castellan, 1988) , CART identifies several such points, building trees by recursive statistical decisions (McKenzie and Low, 1992) . The result is a hierarchical structure in which each discontinuity reveals a transition within the time trend.
Average risk of war
The average rate of risk of war in Ahmadinejad is 3.5 (min/max ¼ 1.4/5.9, SD ¼ 1.6, N ¼ 42). In Khamenei, the rate is 1.3 (min/max ¼ À0.6/3.4, SD ¼ 1.0, N ¼ 47). In Netanyahu, the rate is À1.0 (min/max ¼ À2.4/0.3, SD ¼ 0.6, N ¼ 34). Lastly, in Clinton, the rate is À0.7, (min/max ¼ À2.7/5.2, SD ¼ 1.7, N ¼ 34). The two extremes on a scale of average risk are Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Ahmadinejad. The average rate of risk for Ahmadinejad is way above that of the other political figures, even of Khamenei.
The course of the risk of war
The risk of war (Table 3) is receding linearly and significantly in the speeches of Ayatollah Khamenei (Fig. 1) . President Ahmadinejad (Fig. 2) too relents, then does not, releasing a new energy in his speeches. The meaning of Figures 1 and 2 is that a change is taking place. In Khamenei, the mean speed of risk of war decreases at the slow rate of À0.02 (; Table 3 ) a month. In Ahmadinejad, the mean speed of risk of war decreases at the rate of À0.15 until month 28 included (November 2010) after which the speed increases at the slow rate of 0.002 until month 42 (January 2012). The trend toward making terms persists on the Iranian side in a way that it does not elsewhere. Yet the sometimes unbecoming style of both Ayatollah Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad had made us expect changes in the opposite direction. With the noted decreasing trends, in both of them we found change-points inside the trends. In the Khamenei series, we found a shift down separating the period before January 2010 (month 24) (M ¼ 1.6, n ¼ 24, SD ¼ 0.9) from that after (month 25, February 2010) (M ¼ 0.9, n ¼ 23, SD ¼ 0.9). In the Ahmadinejad series, we identified a similar shift down, before August 2009 (month 15) (M ¼ 4.2, n ¼ 15, SD ¼ 0.9) and after (month 16, September 2009) 
The course of the risk of war in the speeches of Secretary of State Clinton (Table 3 and Fig. 3 ) rises linearly and significantly. This is a reverse direction to that of Khamenei and Ahmadinejad. In her speeches, the mean speed of risk of war increases at the rate of 0.06 a month. (By comparison, the mean speed of risk of war in the speeches of Prime Minister Blair before the Anglo-American intervention in Iraq was 0.02 a month over 72 months; Hogenraad, 2005, Fig. 3, p. 147) . The increasing risk of war in Secretary Clinton's speeches comes as a surprise, considering the low rate of risk at the start-from a low point of À2.57 on month 1, to a high point of 0.13 on month 34. We ferreted out a first upward cutoff-point before -12; 2009, months 13-23; 2010, months 24-35; 2011, months 36-46; 2012, month 47 We found a secondary downward shift within the first subperiod, before (M ¼ À1.0, n ¼ 9, SD ¼ 0.9) and after November 2009 (month 9) (M ¼ À2.1, n ¼ 6, SD ¼ 0.5). Finally, the course of the risk of war in the speeches of Prime Minister Netanyahu is not statistically significant (Fig. 4) and shows no turning point. That does not mean the lack of statistical significance is meaningless or inconclusive. The absence of direction gives away the uncertainty associated with the expressed motives of the Israeli Prime Minister, which is informative in itself. -9; 2009, months 10-19; 2010, months 20-30; 2011, months 31-41; 2012, month 42 4.3 The course of the rate of vagueness
The average rate of vagueness is 6.7 in Ahmadinejad (min/max ¼ 0/7.8, SD ¼ 1.2, N ¼ 42), 8.7 in Khamenei (min/max ¼ 8/9.5, SD ¼ 0.3, N ¼ 47), 7.6 in Netanyahu (min/max ¼ 6.4/8.4, SD ¼ 0.4, N ¼ 34), and 7.4 in Clinton (min/max ¼ 6.1/9.2, SD ¼ 0.6, N ¼ 34). The course of the rate of vagueness increases linearly and significantly in Ahmadinejad, Clinton, and Netanyahu (but not Khamenei) (Table 4 and Figs 5-7) . The speed of increase is slow in each data set, between 0.02 and 0.03 a month. The course of vagueness in Netanyahu adds up to the absence of direction noted earlier for the risk of war: his speeches remain in a lasting state of vagueness throughout. We further bothered to find correlations between the risk of war and the rate of vagueness. We found only one, in Clinton's speeches, a statistically significant lagged one between the risk of war at T 0 and the rate of vagueness at T þ1 (r ¼ 0.66, n ¼ 33, p < 0.0001, CI 95% ¼ 0.37/0.86 using 20,000 resamplings). Changes in the risk of war in Clinton are followed in proportion by changes in the rate of vagueness one month later.
Discussion
War is an event of many layers and its beginnings are always invisible to the naked eye. We relied on the motive imagery model to enlarge our vision of risk while the usual signals of war are still hardly noticeable. To come to this, we assessed how the ratio of power to affiliation imagery that shapes the risk of war spread through the speeches over time. For now, the trends of risk of war in the 10-19; 2010, months 20-30; 2011, months 31-41; 2012, month 42 ambiguity as lack of visibility is not. Just the same, it is difficult to imagine that words bear no relation to events.
Playing martial language against vagueness of language, we noticed the rate of vagueness increased in Ahmadinejad, Clinton, and Netanyahu. But the context of the increases does not mean the same for each of them. Being vague in Iran is not the same as being vague in Washington or Jerusalem. On one side, a martial language like Clinton's, woven with signals of ambiguity, looks like a paradoxical blurred show of confidence. This view is reinforced by the solid lagged correlation in Clinton's speeches between risk of war and rate of vagueness one month later. On the other side, an appeasing language like Ahmadinejad's, woven with more signals of ambiguity, is coherent. Beyond these nuances, vagueness that leaves doors open is helpful in a dispute, even on the Israeli side. At any rate, one would have more to fear from the opposite, that is, an increasingly martial language woven with a decreasing rate of vagueness locking the stance of the disputants. The speeches of President Medvedev in the August 2008 intervention in Georgia (Hogenraad and Garagozov, 2010, p. 22 ) are a case in point.
Ultimately, what we cared about was to foreshadow a risk of war from political speeches. We used a measure of vagueness to modulate that evaluation of risk. With this, we have reached the limit of what one can do to warn of a risk of war using only words. What comes out is that codifying words of motive imagery as links-not causes-prefiguring wars in the making led us to recognise an undeniable risk. However partial this knowledge, we cannot know what knowledge may be useful in the future, except as an inducement to think about conflicts through the words of the other. At least known risks can be handled. It is always the unknown, writes Robert Harris (2011, p. 49 ) (in his recent novel about an automated computer-content analysis artifact run amok!), that is most frightening.
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